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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENE WHEADON and DEANE
WHEADON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
Case
No. 9696

vs.
GEORGE B. PEARSON and SARAH K.
PEARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents

PRELIMINARY STATEME·N·T
Because of the frequent reference in matters quoted
in this brief to the parties as they appeared in the trial
court, the parties will be referred to as they appeared
in the trial court, as follows:
Gene Wheadon and Deane \Vheadon, as Plaintiffs
and Appellants, are herein called ''Plaintiffs"
George ~L Pearson and Sarah K. Pearson, as Defendants and Respondents, are herein called "Defendants."
1
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Defendants agree, in general. with the l'adH a~
stated in the brief of the plaintifl'~. hut not the eonelusions reached by plaintiffs in their brief. Defendants
point out to the Court that there wen• two separatP
suits filed by these same plaintiffs agaim~t these same
defendants, only one of whieh is involved in this appeal.
For the purpose of this brief, herPaftPr the firHt suit,
filed on February 1-t, 1961 a~ ca~e No. J :2~)-t;)() in thP
District Court shall be referred to as the ''first suit,"
and the second suit, having been filed on April 19, 1!)(j~
as Case Xo. 136131, shall be rpferred to as the "second
suit." (R 5)
The first suit was plac.ed in issue het WP(·n the part iP~
and the case came on for pretrial on tJanunr:· J:2, 1!Hi:2.
At pretrial this suit was dis1nissed upon a n1otion for
sun1mary judgment. On January 23, l!Hi:2, a nwtion for
new trial was filed by the plaintiffs and was supported
by several affidavits. This motion for nnv trial wa~
argued and submitted to the Court on ~[arch 1, 1962,
and plaintiffs' motion was denied hy the Honorable
Ray Van Cott, Jr. On April 19, 1962, plaintiffs filed
the second suit against the same defendants. On ~I a~·
.J-, 1962, t'he defendants filed a motion to dismiss as to
the second suit. (R 8) This motion of the defendants
was granted by the H·onorable ~fareellus J(. Snow on
~1:ay 4, 1962. (R 11)
Plaintiffs have only appealed from the order dism,issing the second suit because the time for appeal has
elapsed in the first suit. The ti1ne for appeal in the
2
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first suit had elapsed before the second suit was filed
by the plaintiffs. The statement of facts included in the
brief of the plaintiffs (appellants) shows that the plaintiffs in the first suit "sued defendants for the purpose
of establishing the existence of a permanent easmnent,
appurtenant to plaintiffs' land, across defendants' land."
(page 2 of appellants' brief) In the second suit •· . . .
Plaintiffs again seek to establish a permanent easen1ent
appurtenant to their land across the defendants' land, but
on an entirely different cause of action." Although the
plaintiffs clai1n is an "entirely different cause of action,'' the defendants say it is the same cause of action.
(page 2 of appellants' brief) It is i1nportant, therefore, to point out some of the material issues which
·were pleaded and argued in both of the cases.
In the first suit, which was filed by ~ir. Ray S.
:McCarty, as the attorney for the plaintiffs, it is alleged
that the plaintiffs were owners of a certain tract of
land situated in Salt Lake County and the defendants
were owners of other land adjacent to the plaintiffs,
and
" ... there has been a lane or road of fifteen or
twenty feet in width which is now, and for more
than thirty years has been, used by the plaintiffs,
their grantors and predecessors in interest and
by divers other persons as a vehicular and pedestrian road to gain ingress and egress to and from
the above described real property of plaintiff
and to other real property located by plaintiffs'
land, under claim of right of user, and plaintiffs
and others have notoriously and openly used said
land and road under a right for more than thirty
years, which lane and road extends from a county
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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road, 13800 South, along the canal to the plaintiffs' property." (paragraph3 of page 2 of plaintiffs' complaint in Case No. 129450)
It was also further alleged :
"There is no other way that the plaintiffs can
get to and from their land, and they are unable
to irrigate or tend said property." (paragraph
5 of page 2 of plaintiffs' c01nplaint in case number
129450)
As a matter of relief in the first case the plaintiffs
prayed for judgment as follows :

"1. For an order and decree restraining defendants, and all other persons chtiming by them
or under them, fron1 interfering with plaintiffs'
right-of-way in and out of said land for that purpose, or asserting any claim or interest in said
property inconsistent with such use and right of
plaintiffs." (Prayer of plaintiffs' cornplaint, page
2 of Case No. 129450)
To this pleading the defendants denied that the
plaintiffs had any right-of-way or easement across the
property, and counterclaimed for damages caused to
the properly of the defendants, and the matter was put
at issue. Demand was then made for trial of the issues.
Pursuant to the Rules of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County in effect at that tin1e, the parties
submitted a Statement of Fac,1:s in connection with the
demand for trial in the subject case. In the Statement
of Facts the following statement was submitted to the
Court and signed by the respective attorneys for both
of the parties :
"This case involves the claim by the plain-

4
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tiffs t'o a right-of-way across the property of
the defendants. The defendants claim that the
plaintiffs do not have a right-of-way. Each of
the respective parties claim damages for interference ·with the right-of-way, and the defendants
claiming the damages because of the use of the
property without 'having a right-of~way. The issue
in this case is clear and concise:
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a rightof-way of (sic) (over) the property described
in the complaint.

2. Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled
to damages or whether or not the defendants
are entitled to any damages." (See file on Case
No. 129450)
The matter came on for pretrial on January 12,
1962, before the Honorable Ray Van 1Cott, Jr. ; and at
that time ~I r. Ray S. :McCarty, appearing as attorney
for the plaintiffs, said that his claim for an easement
was based upon a prescribed right of long nse. Discussion was had and documentary evidence was submitted to the pretrial judge. Upon a motion for summary judgment made by defendants' attorney the Court
granted 1the motion based upon the record showing that
the property had been in single ownership of both tracts
within the twenty-year prescriptive period. The order
of dismissal was entered by the Court.
Within the time prescribed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, a motion for a new trial was made,
together with the entrance of appearance of the attorney
Mr. Roger K. Bean of Bean & Bean for and on behalf

5
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·of the plaintiffs. The n1otion for a nPw trial was based
upon the grounds set forth in the n1otion, and providPd
under Rule 59, URCP, as follows :
.. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict of other decision, or that it is against
law," and
''Error in law"
In connection with the rnotion for a new trial, ~Pv
eral affidavits were subnritted to tlw Court h~r the plaintiffs. These affidavits can be surrunarized as ~aying
that the property was at one time in single ownership
and that each had used the property of the defendants
as a right-of-way for a long period of tim<'.
The motion for a new trial, togethPr wi,th the al'l'idavits, was called up for hearing before the Honorable
Ray Van Cott on February '27, 1962, at w'hieh time thP
attorney Roger Bean appeared for and on behalf of
the plaintiffs and the attorney Dean E. Conder appeared
for and on behalf of the defendants. The matter was
argued before The Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. ; and
Mr. Bean argued the information contained in the affidavits, and in particular ~the affidavit of Gene Wheadon,
in whi~h he says :
" ... the use of said road is necessa.ry for ingress
and egress between the public highway (13800
South) and that part of affiant's land which
lies southeast ·of the East Jordan Company Canal;
that all of the products raised on said parcel
must be removed therefrom by means of said
road; that affiant always used the said road
for transportation to the highway of crops raised
on said land, and for the ingress and egress to
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

administer to the needs of the poultry ranged
thereon." (emphasis added)
In the oral argu1nent before the Court the plaintiffs
pointed out the common ownership of the property,
the severance, the use of the right-of-way and the need
for it.
T'he cause of action which the plaintiffs plead in
the second suit is identical \vith that pleaded in the first
suit in that they seek to establish an easement over
exactly the same property of the defendants. The allegation which the~~ now plead in the second suit is as an
easement by necessirty or by implication. This is exactly
what was claimed in the affidavits filed with the Motion
for N erw Trial in the first suit.
The defendants in pleading to rthe complaint of the
plaintiffs' second suit filed a motion to dismiss upon
the grounds of res judicata, since the matter had been
fully disposed of in the first cause of action. This
motion was then heard before the Honorable l\Iarcellus
K. Snow, and a judgment was entered dismissing the
plaintiffs' second cause of action. It is the judgment
dismissing plaintiffs' second cause of action which they
are seeking to reverse by this appeal.
ARGU:M:ENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS
OF RES JUDICATA.

We respectfully submit that the plaintiffs are seeking a second bite at the pie on the matter that was

7
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sub1nitted to the trial court in the first ~uit. They H'P:i\
the same thing in both actions, namely, .. an easement."
The n1atter of an ease1nent by nt-ee~~ity or an implied
easement was submitted to the court in thP fir~t :-;uit
by reason of the affidavits and argun1ents in support
of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
Even if we assume for the purpose of this argument
that the matter of an easement by nece~sity or an implied easement was not subn1itted to the court in tli<'
first suit, it nevertheless was included in the "<·au:-;p of
action'' of the first suit wherein the plaintiffs sought
an ease1nent over the propt>rty of the dPfendants.
In the discussion of whether or not a can:-;(' of
action is res judicata as to a subsequent aetion, Prol'<'~
sor Moore states the following:
''Here the problem is Pssentially one of fairness, and one of ad1ninistrative policy designed
to end litigation: Have the parties litigated or
had a reasonable opportunity to litigate the same
or similar type of issues now rai3ed." (llfoorr· 's
Federal Practice, Volume II, Page 378)
The Supreme Court of 1he United States in two
important decisions has discussed this matter of the
plea in judgment. The first case was the ease of United
States vs. California and 0. Land C01npany (1904) 192
U.S. 355, 24 S.Ct. 266, 48 L.I~d. 476. In ~this case an
action was brought to have certain patents for lands
declared void, on the grounds that the lands were within
an Indian reservation. The land company pleaded the
mrutter of res judicata, saying that there had already

8
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been a prior suit and a final decree in which this matter
was determined. The trial court dismissed the bill. The
Supreme Court of the United States said thrut the only
thing they could find distinguishing the two cases was
that in the latter case the United States had put forward
a new ground for its prayer, but in both cases it sought
to establish its own title to the fee, and the plea of
res judicata was sustained. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote
t'he decision for the Supreme Court, and in this ease
he stated:
1

"The best that can be said, apart frmn the act
just quoted, to distinguish the two suits, is that
now the United States puts forward a new ground
for its prayer. Formerly it sought to avoid the
patents by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the
same conclusion by a different means,-that is to
say, by evidence that the lands originally were
excepted from the grant. But in this as in the
former suit, it seeks to establish its own title to
the fee.
It may be the law in Scotland that a judg1nent
is not a bar to a second attempt to reach the same
result by a different medium concludendi. Phosphate Sewage: Co. v. Molleson, 5 Ct. Sess. Cas.
4th Series, 1125, 1139; although in the same
case on appeal Lord Blackburn seemed to doubt
the proposition if the facts were known before.
S. C. L. R. 4 App. Cas. 801, 820. But the whole
tendency of our de.cisiJons vs to requiJr,e a platntiff
to try his whole oause of action and his whole
case at one time. He cannot even split up his
claim (Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11; Trask v. Ha,rtford & N.H. R. Co. 2 Allen, 331; Freeman, Judgm.
4th ed. §§ 238, 241) ; and, a fortiori, he cannot
divide the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute
of 1889 put the former suit upon a peculiar foot-

9
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ing, the Fnited States u·as lwlflld then to ln·iu,rl
forward all the grounds ~t had for d cclarin,r1 the
patents void, and when the bill wa . .· d iscussl'd, was
barred as to all by the decree. (Citing Ca~<-'~)
(En1phasis added)

In a subsequent ease before the United ~tatP~ ~u
preine Court, the case of Baltimore S. S. Co. et al r.
Phillips (1927), 274 F.S. 316, -1-7 S. Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed.
1069, the Court had before it a case in 'Yhieh the plaintiff had brought an action in adn1iralty for injuries HUHstained, and a decision was rendered in the admiralt~·
court. This sum was paid and the dPen•p satisfied. Nuh~equently. this action was brought, and the complaint
alleged that there was negligencP on the part of the
petitioners and that the individual sustained serious
injuries as a result of said negligence. The petitioner~
answered and set up res judicata based upon the decrPP
in admiralt)~. l\lr. Justice Sutherland in writing the
opinion for the Court states:
"Here the court below concluded that the
cause of action set up in the second case was not
the same as that alleged in the first, because th('
grounds of negligence pleaded were distinct and
different in character; the ground alleged in the
first case being the use of defective appliances,
and in the second, the negligent operation of the
appliances by the officers and co-employees.
Upon pr.inciple, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but one ,actionable wrong, and
was entitled to but one recovery, whether his
injury was due to one or the other of several
disttnct acts of alleged negligence, or to a combination of some or .all of them. In either view,
there would be but a single wrongful invasvon of

10
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a single primary right of the plaintiff, na1nely,
the right of bodily safety, whether the acts con.stitut?}ng such invasion were one or rno;ny, simple
or complex.
"A cause of action does not consist of facts,
but of the unlawful violati·on of a right which
the facts show. The number and variety of the
facts alleged do not establish more than one
cause of action so long as their result, whether
they be considered severally or in combination,
is the violation of but one right by a single legal
wrong. The mere multiplication of grounds of
negligence alleged as causing the same injury
does not result in multiplying the causes of action.
'The facts are merely the means, and not the
end. They do not constitute t'he cause of action,
but they show its existence by making the wrong
appear. "'The thtng, therefore, which in contemplation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for
action, is not the group of facts alleged in the
declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of
these in a legal wrong, the existence of whiJch, if
true, they conclustvely evince." ' Chobanian v.
\Vashburn Wire Company, 33 R.I. 289, 302, 80 A.
394, 400 (Ann. Cas. 1913D, 730).
"The injured respondent was bound to set
forth in his first action for damages every ground
of negligence which he claimed to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted, as was
attempted here, to rely upon them by piecemeal
in successive actions to recover for the same
wrong and injury." (Citing cases) (Emphasis
added)
Our own rtah Supreme Court has considered this
matter of res judicata on a cause of action, and ?\f r.
Justice Wade in writing for the Court in the case of
East ilhll Creek Water Company cs. Salt Lake City
11
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( 1945) 180 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863, S'tated as follows:
"·This contention overlooks the fact that there
are two kinds of cases where the doctrine of res
judicata is applied: In the one the former action
is an absolUJte bar to the maintenance of the
second; it usually bars the successful party as
well as t:he loser; it must be between the same
parties or their privies; it applies not only to
points and issues which are actually raised and
,dedded there~'n but also to such as could have
been therein ajudic.ated, but it only applies where
the claim, demand or cause of action is the same
in both cases. In such case the courts hold that
the parties should litigate their entire claim, demand and cause of action, and every part, issue
and ground thereof, and if one of the pa·rties
f.ails to raise .any po~nt or issue or to l.itig.ate any
part of his claim, demand or cause of action and
the matter goes to final judgment, such party
may not .aga~n litigat.e that cla~m, demand or
cause of acNon or .any issue, point or part thereof
which he could have but failed to litigate in the
fo.rmer act.ion. On the other hand where the
claim, demand or cause of action is different in
the two cases then the former is res judicata of
the latter only to the extent that the former actually raised and decided the same points and issues
which are raised in the latter." (Citing cases)
(Emphasis added)
The primary issue in this case, therefore, seen1s to
be whether or not a new eause of action is stated by
the second suit filed by the plaintiffs herein. The Utah
Supreme Court has defined a ''cause of action" in the
case of St.ate vs. California Packing Corporation (1943)
105 U. 182, 1414 P.2d 386, at page 387, as follows:

12
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''Do such allegations state a cause of action 1
As so often said, to state a cause of aetion a complaint must show:
"A primary right existing in the plaintiff;
a primary duty with regard thereto imposed by
law on the defendant; a delict by the defendant
with respect to plaintiff's right."
This same definition is recognized by numerous other
coui,ts. See cases cited in Wor.ds and Phr,ases, Permanent
Edition, Volume 6, "·Cause of Action,'' subparagraph
"Primary Right and Infringement Thereof" in the 1962
Pockert Supplement, Page 135.
The right which the plaintiffs seek in both the first
and second case is the right to cross the land of the
defendants, by wa.y of an easement. The duty which it
is claimed the defendants owe in each case is exactly
the same, and that is the right to allow rthe plaintiffs to
cross the land of the defendants and that the defendants
have been delict by prohibiting and restraining the plaintiffs fro1n using defendants' land. Where these issues
have been determined by the court they becmne res
judicata as to any subsequent action. This is clearly set
forth in Volume 30A, Am. Jur. "Judg1nents" Sections
371 and 372, as follows:
"§371. Generally.-It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action, and
were there admitted or judicially determined, are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, and that such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a
subsequent aclion between the same parties or

13
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their pnv1es, regardless of the form the issue
may take in the subsequent action, whether the
subsequent action involves the same or a different
form of proceeding, or whether the second action
is upon the same or a different cause of action,
subject matter, claim, or demand, as thP earlier
action. In suCh cases, it is also immaterial that
the two aetions are based on different grounds,
or tried on different theories, or instituted for
different purposes, and seek different relief....
§372. 111atters Not Previously AdjudicatedIdentical Causes of Action.-The phase of tlw
doctrine of res judicata precluding subsequent
litigation of the same cause of action is much
broader in its application than a detennination
of the questions involved in the prior action; the
conclusiveness of the judgment in such case extends not only to matters actually determined,
but also to other matters which could properly
have been determined in the prior action. This
rule applies to every question falling 'vithin the
purview of the original action, in respect to matters of both claim and defense which could have
been presented by the exercise of due diligence."
(Emphasis added)

To assume the position claimed by the appellant in
this case could only lead to continuous and endless relitigations of matters. The respondent has searched for
a case involving an identical fac;t situation of an easement, but has not found such a case. However, numerous
cases are cited by the authorities to the effect that a
elaim arising out of negligence is res judicata to a subsequent case based upon negligence even though upon
a different theory. (See Baltimore 8. 8. Co. et al v.
Phill.ips (supra)

14
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The analogy to the negligence cases and the clain1
made by the appellant herein may be used by saying:
If the plaintiff sought to recover for a personal injury
arising out of an automobile accident in which the plaintiff said there was negligence on the part of t'he defendant, and tried to show negligence by aots of corn1nission
but lost the lawsuit, the plaintiff could then come hack
in and sue the defendant again on the basis of negligence,
but this ti1ne claim acts of omission. It is tn1e the facts
which may constitute negligent omission and negligent
commission may not be identical, but they constitute
but one cause of action.
CONCLl~SION

\Ve re,spectfully submit, therefore, that the issue
sought to be determined by the plaintiffs in the first
cause of action was whether or not the plaintiffs had
the right-of-way or an easement upon the property of
the defendants, and this issue was detern1ined by the
court in the first instance. The second action involves
exactly the same cause of action and is precluded frmn
being raised a second time by the doctrine of res judicata.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN E. CONDER
NIELSEN, CONDER & HAX~E~
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants aud
Respondents
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